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Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive survey of
the existing blockchain protocols for the Internet of Things
(IoT) networks. We start by describing the blockchains and
summarizing the existing surveys that deal with blockchain
technologies. Then, we provide an overview of the application
domains of blockchain technologies in IoT, e.g, Internet of
Vehicles, Internet of Energy, Internet of Cloud, Fog computing,
etc. Moreover, we provide a classification of threat models, which
are considered by blockchain protocols in IoT networks, into five
main categories, namely, identity-based attacks, manipulation-
based attacks, cryptanalytic attacks, reputation-based attacks,
and service-based attacks. In addition, we provide a taxonomy
and a side-by-side comparison of the state-of-the-art methods
towards secure and privacy-preserving blockchain technologies
with respect to the blockchain model, specific security goals,
performance, limitations, computation complexity, and commu-
nication overhead. Based on the current survey, we highlight
open research challenges and discuss possible future research
directions in the blockchain technologies for IoT.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Consensus, Security, Threats, IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, we have witnessed the potential of
Internet of Things to deliver exciting services across several
sectors, from social media, business, intelligent transportation
and smart cities to the industries [1], [2], [3]. IoT seamlessly
interconnects heterogeneous devices with diverse functional-
ities in the human-centric and machine-centric networks to
meet the evolving requirements of the earlier mentioned sec-
tors. Nevertheless, the significant number of connected devices
and massive data traffic become the bottleneck in meeting
the required Quality-of-Services (QoS) due to the computa-
tional, storage, and bandwidth-constrained IoT devices. Most
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Fig. 1. Blockchain structure.
recently, the blockchain [4], [5], [6], [7], a paradigm shift, is
transforming all the major application areas of IoT by enabling
a decentralized environment with anonymous and trustful
transactions. Combined with the blockchain technology, IoT
systems benefit from the lower operational cost, decentralized
resource management, robustness against threats and attacks,
and so on. Therefore, the convergence of IoT and blockchain
technology aims to overcome the significant challenges of
realizing the IoT platform in the near future.
Blockchain, a distributed append-only public ledger tech-
nology, was initially intended for the cryptocurrencies, e.g.,
Bitcoin1. In 2008, Satoshi Nakamato [8] introduced the con-
cept of blockchain that has attracted much attention over the
past years as an emerging peer-to-peer (P2P) technology for
distributed computing and decentralized data sharing. Due
to the adoption of cryptography technology and without a
centralized control actor or a centralized data storage, the
blockchain can avoid the attacks that want to take control
over the system. Later, in 2013, Ethereum, a transaction-based
state-machine, was presented to program the blockchain tech-
nologies. Interestingly, due to its unique and attractive features
such as: transactional privacy, security, the immutability of
data, auditability, integrity, authorization, system transparency,
and fault tolerance, blockchain is being applied in several
sectors beyond the cryptocurrencies. Some of the areas are
identity management [9], intelligent transportation [10], [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15], supply-chain management, mobile-crowd
sensing [16], agriculture [17], Industry 4.0 [18], [19], Internet
1Apart from Bitcoin, there are several cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin,
Peercoin, Swiftcoin, Peercoin, and Ripple.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of blockchain working methodology.
of energy [20], [21], [18], [22], and security in mission critical
systems [23].
As shown in Fig. 1, the blockchain structure is composed of
a sequence of blocks, which are linked together by their hash
values. In the blockchain network, a public ledger maintains
the digitally signed transactions of the users in a P2P network.
In general, a user has two keys: a public key for other users
for the encryption and a private key to read an encrypted
message, as shown in Fig. 2. From the blockchain perspective,
the private key is used for signing the blockchain transaction
and the public key represents the unique address. Asymmetric
cryptography is used to decrypt the message encrypted by the
corresponding public key. At the initial stage, a user signs
a transaction using its private key and broadcasts it to its
peers. Once the peers receive the signed transaction, they
validate the transaction and disseminate it over the network.
All the parties who are involved in the transactions mutually
validate the transaction to meet a consensus agreement. Once
a distributed consensus is reached, the special node, called
as miners, includes the valid transaction into a timestamped
block. The block, which is included by the miner, is broadcast
back into the network. After validating the broadcast block,
which contains the transaction, as well as hash-matching it
with the previous block in the blockchain, the broadcast block
is appended to the blockchain.
Based on the data management and the type of applications,
blockchain can classified either as private (permission) or pub-
lic (permissionless). Both classes are decentralized and provide
a certain level of immunity against faulty or malicious users
for the ledger. The main differences between private and public
blockchains lie in the execution of the consensus protocol, the
maintenance of the ledger, and the authorization to join to the
P2P network. Detailed examples of these classes are illustrated
in [24]. In the context of IoT, blockchains can be classified
based on authorization and authentication. As shown in Fig. 3,
in a private blockchain, the centralized trusted authority that
manages the authentication and authorization process selects
the miners. On the other hand, in a public blockchain (in
general, permissionless), there is no intervention of any third-
party for the miner selection and joining for a new user to the
blockchain network.
Recently, there is a huge amount of investment from the
industries [25], [26] as well as a significant interest from
academia to solve major research challenges in blockchain
technologies. For example, the consensus protocols are the
major building blocks of the blockchain technologies, thus, the
threats targeting the consensus protocols become a significant
research issue in the blockchain. Furthermore, blockchain
forks bring threats to the blockchain consensus protocols.
Moreover, it is observed that the vulnerability is about 51%
for a new blockchain [27]. At the same time, maintenance
of several blockchains requires a significant amount of power
consumption [28].
A. Related Surveys and Our Contributions
There are related survey papers [7], [29], [30], [31], [24],
[32] that covered different aspects of the blockchain tech-
nology. For example, a brief overview of blockchain for
bitcoin was discussed in [29], [30]. However, these surveys
are very limited regarding detailed discussion on research
challenges in blockchain. Moreover, Sankar et al. [29] briefly
presented the feasibility of various consensus protocols in the
blockchain. The detailed insights of bitcon were presented
in [7]. Recently, the surveys [24] presented the overview
of Blockchain-based IoT (BIoT) applications. The security
and privacy aspects are presented in [32], [31] for bitcoin,
one of the blockchain applications. Table I summarizes the
main focuses and major contributions of the previous com-
prehensive surveys on blockchain technologies. Although the
above mentioned surveys [7], [31], [24], [32] have laid a solid
foundation for blockchain technologies, our survey differs in
several aspects. The main contributions of this paper are:
• We provide overviews of the different application do-
mains of blockchain technologies in IoT, e.g, Internet
of Vehicles, Internet of Energy, Internet of Cloud, Fog
computing, etc.
• We classify the threat models, which are considered by
the blockchain protocols in IoT networks, into five main
categories, namely, identity-based attacks, manipulation-
based attacks, cryptanalytic attacks, reputation-based at-
tacks, and service-based attacks.
• We review existing research on anonymity and privacy in
Bitcoin systems.
3TABLE I
RELATED SURVEYS ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES
Year Author Main focus/contributions
2016 Tschorsch andScheuermann [7]
Fundamental structures and insights of
the core of the Bitcoin protocol and its
applications
2017 Sankar et al. [29] Feasibility and efficiency of consensusprotocols in blockchain.
2017 Kaushik etal. [30] A brief survey on bitcoin.
2018 Khalilov andLevi [31]
An overview and detailed investigation
of anonymity and privacy in
Bitcoin-like digital cash systems.
2018
Fernández-
Caramés and
Fraga-Lamas [24]
A review on developing
Blockchain-based IoT (BIoT)
applications.
2018 Conti et al. [32]
A systematic survey that covers the
security and the privacy aspects of
Bitcoin.
• We provide a taxonomy and a side-by-side comparison,
in a tabular form, of the state-of-the-art on the re-
cent advancements towards secure and privacy-preserving
blockchain technologies with respect to blockchain
model, specific security goals, performance and limita-
tions, computation complexity and communication over-
head.
• We highlight the open research challenges and discuss
the possible future research directions in the field of
blockchain technologies for IoT.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the application domains of blockchain technolo-
gies in IoT. In Section III, we present the classification of
threat models that are considered by the blockchain protocols
in IoT networks. In Section IV, we present a side-by-side
comparison, in a tabular form, of the state-of-the-art on the
recent advancements towards secure and privacy-preserving
blockchain technologies. Then, we discuss open issues and
recommendations for further research in Section V. Finally,
we draw our conclusions in Section VI.
II. BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS FOR THE IOT
As presented in Fig. 4, the blockchain technology can be
effectively applied in almost all domains of IoT.
A. Internet of healthcare things
The usage of IoT in healthcare has allowed to feed the
ehealthcare systems with clinical data related to the patients,
their family, their friends, as well as the healthcare providers.
The data, called electronic medical records (EMRs), is stored
by the responsible healthcare provider. To facilitate patient
data portability, there are the electronic health records (EHRs),
which have a richer data structure than EMRs. Based on
the idea of distributed online database, Esposito et al. [33]
proposed the design of a blockchain-based scheme for the IoT
in healthcare. In a model of consortium blockchain, a new
block is instantiated and distributed when new healthcare data
is created. To preserve the privacy of patients and maintain the
Trusted Authority
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) Public blockchain system; (b) Private blockchain system.
immutability of EHRs, Guo et al. [34] introduced an attribute-
based signature scheme, named MA-ABS, which uses multiple
authorities. The MA-ABS scheme uses the blockchain tech-
nology and can resist to N-1 corrupted authorities collusion
attacks. In addition, the MA-ABS is unforgeable in suffering
a selective predicate attack. Therefore, Liang et al. [35] used
the blockchain network in mobile healthcare applications for
integrity protection, further auditing or investigation.
B. Internet of things in the 5G era
In the IoT era, 5G will enable a fully mobile and connected
society for billions of connected objects [44]. To solve the
privacy issues in the 5G heterogeneous communication envi-
ronment, Fan et al. [45] proposed a blockchain-based privacy
preserving and data sharing scheme. Based on the idea of
adding blocks to the blockchain, each new block is connected
to the blockchain by its hash value. Note that the previous
hash value can be known from the block header.
C. Internet of vehicles
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is an emerging concept,
which allows the integration of vehicles into the new era of
the IoT in order to establish the smart communication be-
tween vehicles and heterogeneous networks such as vehicle-to-
vehicle, vehicle-to-road, vehicle-to-human, vehicle-to-sensor,
and vehicle-to-everything. However, some recent works try
4Fig. 4. Blockchain applications for the IoT.
to apply the blockchain technology to IoV. Based on the
decentralized security model, Huang et al. [10] proposed
a blockchain ecosystem model, named LNSC, for electric
vehicle and charging pile management. The LNSC model uses
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to calculate hash functions
electric vehicles and charging piles. To avoid the location
tracking in the IoV, Dorri et al. [11] proposed a decentralized
privacy-preserving architecture, where overlay nodes manage
the blockchain. In addition, the hash of the backup storage is
stored in the blockchain.
Without the administration from the central manager, Lei
et al. [12] proposed a blockchain-based dynamic key man-
agement for vehicular communication systems. Based on a
decentralized blockchain structure, the third-party authorities
are removed and the key transfer processes are verified and
authenticated by the security manager network. Moreover,
Kang et al. [13] introduced a P2P electricity trading system,
named PETCON, to illustrate detailed operations of localized
P2P electricity trading. Using consortium blockchain method,
the PETCON system can publicly audit and share transaction
records without relying on a trusted third party. To solve
the issues of forwarding reliable announcements without re-
vealing users’ identities, Li et al. [14] proposed a privacy-
preserving scheme, named CreditCoin, for sending announce-
ments anonymously in the IoV. The CreditCoin scheme uses
the blockchain via an anonymous vehicular announcement
aggregation protocol to build trust in the IoV communications.
For data credibility assessment in the IoV, Yang et al. [15]
proposed a blockchain-based reputation system, which can
judge the received messages as either true or false based on
the senders’ reputation values.
D. Internet of Energy
The Internet of energy (IoE) provides an innovative concept
to increase the visibility of energy consumption in the Smart
Grid. Based on the sovereign blockchain technology, Gao
5TABLE II
MAJOR ATTACKS ON BLOCKCHAIN
Threat model Countermeasures Resistant protocols
Key attack - Elliptic curve encryption is used to calculate the hash functions LNSC protocol [10]
DDoS/DoS attack
- Distributed SDN architecture DistBlockNet protocol [36]
- Decentralized mixing service CoinParty protocol [37]
- Ring signature using ECDSA Liu et al.’s protocol [38]
-Block size limitation, attribute-based signatures, and multi-receivers encryption BSeIn protocol [39]
Replay attack
- Elliptic curve encryption is used to calculate the hash functions LNSC protocol [10]
- The freshness of public/private key pairs BSeIn protocol [39]
Hiding Blocks - An immutable chain of temporally ordered interactions is created for each agent TrustChain protocol [40]
False data injection attack - Blockchain consensus mechanisms Liang et al.’s protocol [21]
Tampering attack - Public-key cryptosystem Wang et al.’s protocol [41]
Impersonation attack
- Elliptic curve encryption is used to calculate the hash functions LNSC protocol [10]
- Distributed incentive mechanism based blockchain and the node cooperation
based privacy protection mechanism
Wang et al.’s protocol [16]
- Attribute-based signatures BSeIn protocol [39]
Refusal to Sign - Not interacting with the malicious agent, or splitting the transactions in smaller
amounts
TrustChain protocol [40]
Overlay attack - Every transaction is embedded with a Time-Stamp to mark the uniqueness Wang et al.’s protocol [41]
Double-spending attack
- Multi signatures and anonymous encrypted message propagation streams Aitzhan and Svetinovic’s protocol [22]
- Time-Stamp and the Proof-of-Work mechanism Wang et al.’s protocol [41]
Modification attack
- Elliptic curve encryption is used to calculate the hash functions LNSC protocol [10]
- The attribute signature and the MAC BSeIn protocol [39]
Collusion attack - Blockchain-based incentive mechanism He et al.’s protocol [42]
Whitewashing attack - Lower priorities are given to the agents of new identities TrustChain protocol [40]
Quantum attack - Lattice-based signature scheme Yin et al.’s protocol [43]
Man-in-the-middle attack
- Elliptic curve encryption is used to calculate the hash functions LNSC protocol [10]
- Secure mutual authentication BSeIn protocol [39]
Sybil attack - An immutable chain of temporally ordered interactions is created for each agent TrustChain protocol [40]
et al. [20] introduced a monitoring system on Smart Grid,
named GridMonitoring, for ensuring transparency, provenance,
and immutability. The GridMonitoring system is based on
four layers, namely, 1) Registration and authentication layer,
2) Smart meter, 3) Processing and consensus nodes, and
4) Data processing on the smart grid network. In modern
power systems, Liang et al. [21] proposed a data protection
framework based on distributed blockchain, which can resist
against data manipulation that are launched by cyber attackers
(e.g., false data injection attacks). To guarantee data accuracy,
Liang’s framework uses the consensus mechanism, which is
automatically implemented by every node and has the rep-
resentative characteristics, namely, 1) Setting of public/private
key update frequency, 2) Block generation, 3) Miner selection,
and 4) Release of meter’s memory periodically. For secure
energy trading in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), Li et al.
[18] introduced the energy blockchain, which is based on the
consortium blockchain technology and the Stackelberg game.
Aitzhan and Svetinovic [22] implemented a token-based pri-
vate decentralized energy trading system for in decentralized
smart grid energy, which can be applied to the IoE.
E. Internet of Things devices
In the Internet of Things devices, attackers seek to exfiltrate
the data of IoT devices by using the malicious codes in
malware, especially on the open source Android platform.
By utilizing statistical analysis method, Gu et al. [46] intro-
duced a malware detection system based on the consortium
Blockchain, named CB-MDEE, which is composed of de-
tecting consortium chain by test members and public chain
by users. The CB-MDEE system adopts a fuzzy comparison
method and multiple marking functions In order to reduce
the false-positive rate and improve the detection ability of
malware variants. To protect the embedded devices in the
IoT, Lee et al. [47] a firmware update scheme based on the
blockchain technology, which the embedded devices have the
two different operation cases, namely, 1) response from a
verification node to a request node, and 2) response from a
response node to a request node.
F. Access Management in IoT
For managing IoT devices, Novo [48] proposed a distributed
access control system using the blockchain technology. The
architecture of this system is composed of six components,
namely, 1) Wireless sensor networks, 2) Managers, 3) Agent
node, 4) Smart contract, 5) Blockchain network, and 6)
Management hubs. This system brings some advantages for
the access control in IoT, such as: 1) mobility, which can be
used in isolated administrative systems; 2) accessibility, which
ensures that the access control rules are available at any time;
63) concurrency, which allows that the access control policies
can be modified simultaneously; 4) lightweight, which means
that the IoT devices do not need any modification to adopt
this system; 5) scalability, as the IoT devices can be connected
through different constrained networks; 6) transparency, where
the system can preserve the location privacy.
G. Collaborative video delivery
The diffusion of high-quality content in the IoT nowadays
challenges for the internet service providers. However, Herbaut
and Negru [49] proposed a decentralized brokering mechanism
for collaborative blockchain-based video delivery, which is
relying on advanced network services chains. Specifically, this
management mechanism is composed of three blockchains,
namely, 1) the content brokering blockchain, 2) the delivery
monitoring blockchain, and 3) the provisioning blockchain. In
addition, this management mechanism is deployed with the
open source project Hyperledger-Fabric 2 where the results
show that the number of nodes slightly increases the conver-
gence time .
H. Internet of Cloud
In the Internet of Cloud (IoC), billions of IoT devices
upload their data to the cloud through the internet connection
utilizing virtualization technology. Xu et al. [50] introduced an
intelligent resource management for cloud datacenters based
on the blockchain technology, in order to save and reduce the
total cost of energy consumption. Specifically, the users use
their individual private keys to sign a transaction, while the
neighboring users verify the broadcast transaction. The block
is discarded when it does not pass verification. Therefore,
Sharma et al. [51] proposed a distributed cloud architec-
ture that uses three emerging technologies, namely, software-
defined networking (SDN), fog computing, and a blockchain
technique. The SDN controllers of the fog node are used to
provide programming interfaces to network management op-
erators. The blockchain technique is used to provide scalable,
reliable, and high-availability services. In addition, Xia et al.
[52] proposed a blockchain-based data sharing system, named
MeDShare, for cloud service providers. This system uses four
layers namely, 1) User layer, 2) Data query layer, 3) Data
structuring and provenance layer, and 4) Existing database
infrastructure layer.
I. Intrusion Detection
Many techniques for implementing intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDSs) in the IoT environment have been proposed, which
are based in machine learning. To improve the collaborative
intrusion detection systems (CIDSs), Alexopoulos et al. [53]
introduced the idea of utilizing blockchain technology in
order to secure the exchange of alerts between the collab-
orating nodes. Meng et al. [54] discussed the applicability
of blockchain technology in a intrusion detection systems.
Modern intrusion detection systems must be based on collabo-
rative communication among distributed IDSs [55], demanding
2www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
extensive data sharing among entities and trust computation.
In order to deal with the privacy concerns that are raised by the
data exchange and to suppress insider attacks, the blockchain
technology is applied. In this way, the use of trusted third
party, which is also a single point of failure, that is needed in
traditional collaborative IDSs can be avoided.
J. Software-defined networking
To increase IoT’s bandwidth, researchers have been propos-
ing the Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology,
which provides intelligent routing and simplifies decision-
making processes by the SDN controller [56]. Recently,
Sharma et al. [36] proposed a distributed IoT network archi-
tecture, named DistBlockNet. Based on the blockchain tech-
nology, DistBlockNet architecture can provide scalability and
flexibility, without the need for a central controller. The dis-
tributed blockchain network uses two type of nodes, namely, 1)
the controller/verification node, which maintains the updated
flow rules table information and 2) the request/response node,
which updates its flow rules table in a blockchain network.
K. Fog computing
Fog computing, also called edge computing, is a highly
virtualized platform that enables computing and storage be-
tween end-users and the data Center of the traditional cloud
computing [5]. Without the third parties, Fog devices can com-
municate with each other. However, the blockchain technique
can be used to facilitate communications between fog nodes
and IoT devices. Huang et al. [57] proposed a fair payment
scheme for outsourcing computations of Fog devices. Based
on the bitcoin, this scheme considers the following security
properties, namely, completeness, fairness, and accountability.
L. Distributed P2P Applications
In distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) applications for the IoT,
the IoT devices self-organize and cooperate for a new breed
of applications such as collaborative movies, forwarding files,
delivering messages, electronic commerce, and uploading data
using sensor networks. To incentivize users for cooperation,
He et al. [42] proposed a truthful incentive mechanism based
on the blockchain technique for dynamic and distributed P2P
environments. To prevent selfish users and defend against the
collusion attacks, this scheme proposed a pricing strategy,
which allows intermediate nodes to obtain rewards from
blockchain transactions due to their contribution to a success-
ful delivery.
M. Crowdsensing Applications
The emerging mobile crowdsensing paradigm is a novel
class of mobile IoT applications (e.g., geographical sensing
applications). Wang et al. [16] is an interesting incentive mech-
anism for privacy-preserving in crowdsensing applications
based on the blockchain cryptocurrencies. Specifically, this
mechanism can eliminate the security and privacy issues using
the miners’ verifiable data quality evaluation to deal with the
impersonation attacks in the open and transparent blockchain.
7In addition, to achieve k-anonymity privacy protection, the
mechanism uses a node cooperation method for participating
users.
N. Data storage
The data storage can deal with heterogeneous data resources
for IoT-based data storage systems. How to share and protect
these sensitive data are the main challenges in IoT data
storage. Based on the blockchain technology, Jiang et al. [58]
proposed a private keyword search, named Searchain, for
decentralized storage. The Searchain architecture includes two
component, namely, 1) transaction nodes in a peer-to-peer
structure and 2) a blockchain of all the ordered blocks. In
addition, the Searchain architecture can provide user privacy,
indistinguishability, and accountability.
O. Bitcoin
Launched in 2009, Bitcoin is the peer-to-peer (P2P) pay-
ment network that does not need any central authorities. Based
on the core technique of blockchain, Bitcoin users do not use
real names; instead, pseudonyms are used. Therefore, Bitcoin
is based on three main technical components: transactions,
consensus Protocol, and communication network.
The existing research on anonymity and privacy for Bitcoin
system are presented in Tab. III. Khalilov and Levi [72]
have published an interesting investigation on anonymity and
privacy in Bitcoin-like digital cash systems. Specifically, the
study classified the methods of analyzing anonymity and
privacy in Bitcoin into four categories, namely, 1) Transacting,
2) Utilizing off-network information, 3) Utilizing network, and
4) Analyzing blockchain data.
As discussed by Wang et al. [71], Bitcoin works in practice,
but not in theory,and the main issue is how to protect the
potential buyers’ privacy in Bitcoin using the public key infras-
tructure. Wang et al. [71] studied the designated-verifier proof
of assets for bitcoin exchange using elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. Specifically, the authors proposed a privacy-preserving
scheme, named DV-PoA, which can satisfy unforgeability.
Note that the DV-PoA scheme uses elliptic curve discrete log-
arithm problem, elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman
problem, and collision-resistance of cryptographic hash func-
tion. In addition, to protect the privacy of simplified payment
verification (SPV) clients, Kanemura et al. [70] proposed a
privacy-preserving Bloom filter design for an SPV client based
on γ−Deniability.
By removing the trusted third party, Qin et al. [73] proposed
a distributively blockchain-based PKI for Bitcoin system,
named Cecoin. To ensure the consistency, Cecoin uses an
incentive mechanism and a distributed consensus protocol.
To provide multi-certificate services and identity assignment,
Cecoin converts a triple (address, domain, cert) to a tuple
(key, address, cert), and key represents path of cert in the tree.
Therefore, to protect the transaction privacy in Bitcoin, Wang
et al. [41] proposed a framework by adding the homomorphic
Paillier encryption system to cover the plaintext amounts in
transactions. To solve the trust problem in Bitcoin, Huang et al.
[57] proposed a commitment-based sampling scheme instead
of ringer, which can be used for generic computations in the
outsourcing computing.
III. THREAT MODELS FOR BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we present and describe the threat models
that are considered by the blockchain protocols in IoT net-
works. A summary of 16 attacks are given in Table II, and
are classified into the following five main categories: identity-
based attacks, manipulation-based attacks, cryptanalytic at-
tacks, reputation-based attacks, and service-based attacks, as
presented in Figure 5.
A. Identity-based attacks
The attacks under this category forge identities to masquer-
ade as authorized users, in order to get access to the system and
manipulate it. We classify four attacks, namely: Key attack,
Replay attack, Impersonation attack, and Sybil attack.
• Key attack: This attack is defined in the context of a
system combining electric vehicles and charging piles,
as follows: "If the private key of an electric vehicle
that has been used for longtime leaks, the attacker can
impersonate this electric vehicle to deceive others" [10].
To deal with this attack, LNSC protocol [10] provides
a mutual authentication mechanism between the electric
vehicles and charging piles. To this end, it employs the
elliptic curve encryption to calculate the hash functions,
and hence it ensures resiliency against the key leakage
attack.
• Replay attack: The aim of this attack is to spoof the
identities of two parties, intercept their data packets,
and relay them to their destinations without modifica-
tion. To resist against this attack, LNSC [10] uses the
idea of elliptic curve encryption to calculate the hash
functions. On the other hand, BSein [39] uses a fresh
one-time public/private key pair, which is generated for
each request, to encrypt the message and compute the
Message Authentication Code (MAC). In this way, the
replay attack can be detected.
• Impersonation attack: An adversary tries to masquerade
as a legitimate user to perform unauthorized operations.
As presented in Table II, there are three methods that
are proposed to protect against this attack. The idea of
elliptic curve encryption to calculate the hash functions,
is proposed by LNSC protocol [10]. Wang et al. [16]
propose a distributed incentive-based cooperation mech-
anism, which protects the user’s privacy as well as a
transaction verification method of the node cooperation.
The mechanism hides the user’s privacy information
within a group, and ensures their protection from the
impersonation attack. BSeIn [39], on the other hand,
uses the idea of attribute-based signatures, i.e., only
legitimate terminals can generate a valid signature, and
hence any impersonation attempt will be detected when
its corresponding authentication operation fails.
• Sybil attack: Under this attack, an adversary creates many
fake identities. By performing many interactions in the
network, the adversary can gain a large influence within
8TABLE III
EXISTING RESEARCH ON ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY FOR BITCOIN SYSTEMS
Year Protocol Countermeasures Security models
2013 CoinSwap [59] - The protocol requires four published transactions - Anonymity
2013 CoinJoin [60] - Each user check the mixing transaction before signing on it - Anonymity
2013 ZeroCoin [61] - Decentralized e-cash scheme with a tuple of randomized algorithms (Setup,
Mint, Spend, Verify)
- RSA accumulators and non-interactive zero-knowledge signatures of
knowledge
- Anonymity
2014 Mixcoin [62] - Cryptographic accountability
- Randomized mixing fees
- Anonymity
2014 Xim [63] - Anonymous decentralized pairing - Anonymity
2014 CoinShuffle [64] - Requires only standard cryptographic primitives - Anonymity
2014 Zerocash [65] - Publicly-verifiable preprocessing zero-knowledge - Privacy-preserving
2015 Blindcoin [66] - Blind signature scheme - Anonymity
2015 CoinParty [67] - Combination of decryption mixnets with threshold signatures - Anonymity
2016 Blindly Signed Contract [68] - Blind signature scheme - Anonymity
2017 TumbleBit [69] - Replaces on-blockchain payments with off-blockchain puzzle solving - Anonymity
2017 Kanemura et al. [70] - The privacy metric "Deniability" - Privacy-preserving
2017 Wang et al. [71] - Elliptic curve cryptography - Privacy-preserving
2017 Wang et al. [41] - Homomorphic paillier encryption system - Privacy-preserving
2018 Liu et al. [38] - Ring signature
- Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
- Privacy-preserving
- Anonymity
2018 Huang et al. [57] - Commitment-based sampling scheme - Security requirement of completeness
- Security requirement of fairness
- Security requirement of accountability
Threat models
Identity-
based attacks
Manipulation-
based attacks
Cryptanalytic
attacks
Reputation-
based attacks
Service-
based attacks
Key attack [10]
Replay at-
tack [39], [10]
Impersonation
attack [13], [39],
[10]
Sybil attack [40]
False data injec-
tion attack [21]
Tampering
attack [41]
Overlay at-
tack [41]
Modification
attack [39], [10]
Man-in-the-middle
attack [39], [10]
Quantum at-
tack [43]
Hiding Blocks
attack [40]
Whitewashing [40]
DDoS/DoS
attack [36], [37],
[38], [39]
Refusal to Sign
attack [40]
Double-spending
attack [41], [22]
Collusion
attack [42]
Fig. 5. Classification of threat models for Blockchain.
the community, i.e, increasing/decreasing the reputation
of some agents. TrustChain [40] addresses this issue by
creating an immutable chain of temporally ordered inter-
actions for each agent. It computes the trustworthiness of
agents in an online community with Sybil-resistance by
using prior transactions as input. It ensures that agents
who use resources from the community also contribute
back.
B. Manipulation-based attacks
They involve an unauthorized access and tamper of data.
In this category, four attacks are classified, namely: False
data injection attack, Tampering attack, Overlay attack, and
Modification attack
• False data injection attack: The aim of this attack is to
compromise the data integrity of the control system to
make it take wrong control decisions. Liang et al. [21]
considers the meter node as a private blockchain network.
9In addition, the interactions among the nodes are based
on a consensus mechanism, which consists in executing
a distributed voting algorithm. Each node can verify the
integrity of the received data. The latter is considered
correct when a positive agreement is reached.
• Tampering attack: The adversary may tamper the bitcoin
transactions of the bitcoin addresses, amounts and other
information after signing. To prevent this attack, Wang et
al. [41] use a public-key cryptosystem that is compatible
with the existing Bitcoin system. They propose adding
the homomorphic Paillier encryption system to cover
the plaintext amounts in transactions, and the encrypted
amounts will be checked by the Commitment Proof.
• Overlay attack: It means that the attacker adds a forgery
encrypted amount to the original encrypted amount under
the receiver’s public key. In [41], this attack is detected as
every transaction is embedded with an timestamp to mark
its uniqueness. Different inputs under the same trader can
be distinguished and linked to the different transactions,
and hence resistance against the overlay attack is ensured.
• Modification attack: It consists in modifying the broadcast
transaction or the response message. To deal with this at-
tack, LNSC [10] uses the idea of elliptic curve encryption
to calculate the hash functions. BSeIN [39], on the other
hand, employs the attribute signature and the MAC.
• Man-in-the-middle attack: An attacker by spoofing the
identities of two parties can secretly relay and even
modify the communication between these parties, which
believe they are communicating directly, but in fact the
whole conversation is under the control of the attacker.
To resist against this attack, BSeIn [39] provides secure
mutual authentication. In [10], LNSC provides mutual au-
thentication by using elliptic curve encryption to calculate
the hash functions.
C. Cryptanalytic attacks
They aim to break the cryptographic algorithm and ex-
pose its keys. In [43] the quantum attack is investigated
in blockchain. This attack is designed to solve the elliptic
curve digital logarithm, i.e., derive the private key from the
elliptic curve public key. In this way, an adversary can sign
unauthorized transactions and forge the valid signature of
users. To deal with this issue, Yin et al. [43] uses the idea of
lattice-based signature scheme., which allows deriving many
sub-private keys from the seed in the deterministic wallet of
blockchain.
D. Reputation-based attacks
An agent manipulates his reputation by changing it to a
positive one. In this category, we can find the following
attacks, namely: Hiding Blocks attack, and Whitewashing
attack.
• Hiding Blocks attack: Under this attack, an agent only
exposes transactions that have a positive impact on his
reputation and hides the ones with negative reputation. In
[40], an immutable chain of temporally ordered interac-
tions for each agent. Since each record has a sequence
number, any agent in the network can request specific
records of others. The requested agents cannot refuse to
provide their records. Otherwise, other agents will stop
interacting with them.
• Whitewashing: When an agent has negative reputation, it
can get rid of its identity and make a new one. There is no
way to prevent this behavior. However, it is suggested in
[40] to give lower priorities to the agents of new identities
when applying the allocation policy.
E. Service-based attacks
They aim either to make the service unavailable or make it
behave differently from its specifications. Under this category,
we can find the following attacks:
• DDoS/DoS attack: It involves sending a large amount of
requests to cause the failure of the blockchain system.
As shown in Table II, there are four methods that are
proposed to deal with this attack. The idea of distributed
SDN architecture is proposed by DistBlockNet protocol
in [36]. CoinParty [37] proposes the idea of decentralized
mixing service. Liu et al. [38] employ a ring-based
signature with Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA). The resilience against DOS in BSeIn [39] is
achieved by limiting the block size, checking the maxi-
mum number of attribute signatures for the transaction
input, and using multi-receivers encryption to provide
confidentiality for authorized participants.
• Refusal to Sign attack: A malicious agent can decide
to not sign a transaction that is not in his favor. Al-
though preventing this attack is not possible, punishment
measures can be taken against the refusal agents. It is
proposed in [40] to not interact with the malicious agent,
or split the transactions in smaller amounts. If an agent
refuses to sign a transaction, the interaction is aborted.
• Double-spending attack: It means that the attackers spend
the same bitcoin twice to acquire extra amounts. In [41],
the Time-Stamp and the Proof-of-Work mechanism is
used. In [22], a multi-signature transaction is employed,
where a minimum number of keys must sign a transaction
before spending tokens.
• Collusion Attack: Nodes can collude with each other and
behave selfishly to maximize their profit. In [42], an
incentive mechanism and pricing strategy is proposed to
thwart the selfish behaviors.
IV. EXISTING RESEARCH ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IOT
Table IV summarizes research for blockchain-based IoT
security and privacy.
A. Authentication
In [78], Lin et al. proposed a novel transitively closed
undirected graph authentication scheme that can support
blockchain-based identity management systems. In compar-
ison to other competing authentication schemes, their pro-
posal provides an additional capability of dynamically adding
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TABLE IV
EXISTING RESEARCH FOR BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IOT SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Year Scheme Blockchain model Security model Goal Performance (+) and limitation (-) Comp. complexity
2016 Aitzhan
and
Svetinovic
[22]
- Blockchain technology
with multi signatures and
anonymous encrypted
message propagation
streams
- Privacy preserving - Enables peers to anony-
mously negotiate energy prices
and securely perform trading
transactions
+ Combat double-spending attacks
- A formal proof is not provided on the Sybil-
resistance
Medium
2017 Otte et al.
[40]
- Every participant grows
and maintains their own
chain of transactions
- Distributed trust - Providing strict bounds on
the profitability of a Sybil at-
tack
+ A formal proof is provided on the Sybil-
resistance
- Authentication is not considered
Up to 2n + 1 max-
flow computations
2017 Kanemura
el al. [70]
- Blockchain technology
with Deniability
- Privacy preserving - Improving the privacy level
of a simplified payment verifi-
cation client
+ True positive Bitcoin addresses are hidden by the
false positives in a Bloom filter
- Authentication is not considered
Medium
2017 Wang et
al. [41]
- Blockchain technology
with the Paillier cryp-
tosystem for encryption
and decryption
- Preserving transac-
tion privacy
- Achieving delicate
anonymity and prevents
active and passive attacks
+ Robust transaction
+ Prevent the following attacks: Tampering attack,
Overlay attack, Double-spending attack
- Sybil-resistance
Tdec = 2Tm +
2iTE
2018 Yin et al.
[43]
- Quantum attack in the
blockchain
- Transaction authenti-
cation
- Resisting quantum attack,
while maintaining the wallet
lightweight
+ Strongly unforgeable under chosen message at-
tack
- The Sybil-resistance is not considered
The length of signa-
ture is O(1)
2018 Jong-
Hyouk
Lee [74]
- Consortium Blockchain - Identity and authenti-
cation management
- Creating a new ID as a Ser-
vice
+ It can be implemented as a cloud platform
- The threat model is not defined
Medium
2018 Fan et al.
[45]
- The blockchain is a
public, tamper-resistant
ledger
- Privacy preserving
- Access control
- Achieve the goal of every
data owner’s complete control
+ Backward security
+ Forward security
- The Sybil-resistance is not considered
M + Tm
2018 Wang et
al. [16]
- Blockchain based in-
centive mechanism
- Privacy preserving - Achieve k-anonymity privacy
protection
+ Resist the impersonation attacks in the open and
transparent blockchain
- The collusion attacks is not analysed
Medium
2018 Lin et al.
[75]
- ID-based linearly ho-
momorphic signature
- Authentication - Avoiding the shortcomings of
the use of public key certifi-
cates
+ Secure against existential forgery on adaptively
chosen message and ID attack in the random oracle
model
- Adaptation with the Blockchain is not analyzed
High
2018 Li et al.
[14]
- Blockchain based in-
centive mechanism
- Privacy preserving
- Authentication
- Achieving privacy-
preserving in forwarding
announcements
+ Maintains the reliability of announcements
+ Achieve Sybil-resistance
- Location privacy is not considered
Medium
2018 Ziegeldorf
et al. [37]
- Blockchain technology
with Deniability
- Anonymity
- Deniability
- Achieving correctness,
anonymity, and deniability
+ Resilience against DoS attacks from malicious
attackers
+ Compatible with other crypto-currencies which
use the same ECDSA primitive, e.g., Litecoin and
Mastercoin
- Double-spending attacks is not considered
Medium
2018 Yang et
al. [76]
- The blocks maintain the
proofs produced by the
cloud server
- Accountable trace-
ability
- Achieving public verification
without any trusted third party
+ Achieve public verification
+ Efficient in communication as well as in compu-
tation
- Tampering attack is not considered
The data owner con-
ducts (2 + log2m)
hash computations
2018 Hu et al.
[77]
- The Ethereum
blockchain
- Distributed trust - Saving on the overall deploy-
ment and operational costs
+ Low-cost, accessible, reliable and secure pay-
ment scheme
- Accountable traceability is not considered
Low bandwidth
2018 Liu et al.
[38]
- The blockchain based
on the ring signature
with elliptic curve dig-
ital signature algorithm
(ECDSA)
- Preserving transac-
tion privacy
- Help Bitcoin users protect
their account and transaction
information
+ Resistant to DoS attacks
+ Prevent the mixing server from mapping input
transactions
+ Anonymity and scalability
- Double-spending attacks is not considered
High
2018 Lin et al.
[39]
- The structure of blocks
is similar to that in Bit-
coin
- Authentication
- Access control
- Enforce fine-grained access
control polices
+ Resilience to hijacking attacks, user imperson-
ation attacks, DDoS attacks, modification attacks,
replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks
+ Mutual authentication
+ Session key agreement
+ Perfect forward secrecy
- The Sybil-resistance is not considered
Medium
2018 Lin et al.
[78]
- The Ethereum
blockchain
- Authentication - Solving the existing in-
tractability issue in transitive
signature
+ Update the certificates without the need to re-
sign the nodes
+ Provide a proof when the edge between two
vertices does not exist
- Access control is not considered compared to the
scheme in [39]
Signature size: 2
points in Z∗q
Notations :
M : The time for one exponentiation;
Tm : The size of the ciphertext;
Tdec : The time for decryption;
Tm : The unit of modular multiplication time;
TE : The unit of modular exponentiation time
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or deleting nodes and edges. Moreover, this novel scheme
that was built on Ethereum solves the authentication prob-
lem of non-existent edges, which is a known challenge in
transitive signature schemes. Lin et al.in [39] proposed a
novel blockchain-based framework that can ensure a secure
remote user authentication. The proposed framework combines
attribute-based signatures, multi-receivers encryption and Mes-
sage Authentication Code. In [14], Li et al. proposed a novel
privacy-preserving Blockchain-based announcement network
for Vanets that is based on a threshold authentication protocol
called Echo-Announcement.
Authors in [75] proposed an ID-based linearly homo-
morphic signature schemes that can be used for realizing
authentication in blockchains. The system allows a signer
to produce linearly homomorphic signatures, and hence it
avoids the shortcomings of public-key certificates. In addition,
it is shown to be robust against several attacks. In [74]
authors introduced the concept of blockchain as a service.
Their proposed blockchain based-ID as a Service (BIDaaS)
mechanism, is a new type of IDaaS that can be used for
identity and authentication management. Authentication can
be achieved without the use of any preregistered information
of the user. Finally in [43] authors cope with the problem of
keeping the wallet in a relatively small size while ensuring
the robustness of transaction authentication by introducing a
novel anti-quantum transaction authentication scheme.
B. Privacy-preserving
In the core of blockchain philosophy lies the private key
that can unlock the cryptographic protection of the digital
assets. The private key becomes the highest vulnerability of
a blockchain system whether it is stored on a piece of paper,
screen, disk, in local memory or in the cloud. Users tend to
use digital wallets that can be either software or hardware, e.g.
Trezor or Keepkey, which are vulnerable to various attacks like
fault injections [79].
Another solution that is gaining ground nowadays is the
use of hardware security modules (HSMs), a crypto-processor
that securely generates, protects and stores keys. The entire
cryptographic key lifecycle happens inside the HSM. An HSM
can be a standalone device that operates offline or can be
embedded in a server, can be hardened against tampering or
damage, and is usually located in a physically secure area to
prevent unauthorized access. Finally a new generation of ultra-
secure PCs that have embedded an HSM and requires two-
factor authentication is recently introduced. This PC can be
protected against physical attacks with a tamper-proof casing
and mechanisms like automatic erasion of the private key in
case of any breach of the embedded physical or logical security
controls [80]. Using trusted computers both as secure digital
wallets and blockchain nodes. Security assurance of users and
organizations need in order to trust this new technology can
be provided in the near future.
To achieve k-anonymity privacy protection, Wang et al. [16]
use a node cooperation verification approach, in which each
group contains K nodes to meet the objective of K-anonymity
protection. Aitzhan et al. [22] proposed an idea that protects
parties from passive eavesdropping by hiding non-content data.
For enhancing the transaction privacy in Bitcoin, Wang et al.
[41] achieve transaction by using cryptographic methods, i.e.,
employs the public-key system. Through the standard ring
signature and ECDSA unforgeability, Liu et al. [38] proposed
an idea that can achieve the anonymity.
One other aspect of privacy in blockchain systems is about
anonymity. Although it is possible to design an almost im-
mutable, tamper-resistant transaction, this transaction can be
seen throughout all of the nodes on the blockchain network.
One promising research on supporting private transactions
inside a blockchain is zk-STARKs, which combines zCash
and Ethereum. The combination of both technologies makes it
possible to keep anonymity when conducting payments, blind
auctions, and even voting [73].
C. Trust
A blockchain-based payment scheme that is stet up in a
remote region setting was introduced in [77]. The proposed
scheme is assumed to have an intermittent connectivity to a
bank’s central system. Distributed trust is accomplished with
the use of a two-layer architecture, where the bank authorizes
a set of selected villagers to act as miners who on their
turn authorize transactions among villagers with tokens and
the bank. In [40] authors present a mechanism where every
participant grows and maintains his own chain of transactions.
The proposed approach provides distributed trust, without the
need of any gatekeeper, while being robust against Sybil
attacks.
V. OPEN QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
To complete our overview, we outline both open questions
and research challenges that could improve the capabilities
and effectiveness of blockchain for the IoT, summarized in
the following recommendations:
A. Resiliency against Combined Attacks
As presented in this survey, many security solutions for
bloackchain-based IoT have been proposed in the literature,
each of which is designed to tackle different security issues
and threat models. The main question that might arise is how
to design a security solution that can be resilient against com-
bined attacks while taking into account the implementation
feasibility of the solution, especially in case of low resource-
constrained IoT devices.
B. Dynamic and Adaptable Security Framework
Heterogeneous devices are deployed in the IoT network,
ranging from low-power devices to high-end servers. Hence,
a single security solution cannot be deployed for all the
blockchain-based IoT architectures due to the different amount
of resources that are provided. Therefore, the security solution
should initially adapt itself to the existing resources, and
decide which security services to offer, so as to meet the
minimum security requirements of the end-users. Thus, one
of the challenges that should receive more attention in the
future is how to design such a dynamic and adaptable security
framework for blockchain-based IoT architectures.
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C. Compliance with GDPR
The new regulation that took effect from the 25th of May
of 2018 grants end-users new powers over personal data,
and places new obligations upon data controllers. In a purely
decentralized blockchain system there are not any accountable
data processors making the implementation of GDPR difficult.
Also on the other hand, the right to be forgotten that is one of
the main guidelines of GDPR is contradictory to the core idea
behind blockchain technology. On public blockchains, all data
is replicated and shared across all machines in the network
and only the combination with trusted hardware solutions can
solve this issue. Some initial attempts are already undertaken
[81], [82] but this is a promising area of research for the near
future.
D. Energy-efficient Mining
Mining includes the execution of the blockchain con-
sensus algorithms such as Proof-of-Work (PoW). Besides,
the blockchain grows as the users store their transactions.
Therefore, more powerful miners are required to handle
the consensus protocols in the blockchain. Several energy
efficient consensus algorithms such as Proof-of-Space [83],
Deligated Proof-of-Space [84] and Proof-of-Stake [85] and
mini-blockchain [86], [87] to store only recent blockchain
transactions are suggested. However, resource- and power-
constrained IoT devices are not always capable of meeting the
substantial computational and power consumption in the pro-
cessing of blockchain consensus and storing of blockchains.
Therefore, the design of energy-efficient consensus protocols
is one of the significant research challenges in the blockchain
technologies for IoT.
E. Social Networks and Trust Management
When we talk about security we have to take in mind that
fake news can be a part of a cyber attack. Large-scale rumor
spreading could pose severe social and economic damages
to an organization or a nation [88] especially with the use
of online social networks. Blockchains could be a means
for limiting rumor spreading as presented in [89] where a
blockchain-enabled social network is presented.
F. Blockchain-specific Infrastructure
The storage-limited IoT devices might not be able to store
the large-size blockchain that grows as the blocks are appended
in the blockchain. Moreover, it is commonly seen that the
IoT devices store the blockchain’s data that are not even use-
ful for their own transactions. Therefore, blockchain-specific
equipment that supports the decentralized storage of large-
size blockchain become a challenging issue. Moreover, the
address management and underlying communication protocols
play significant roles in blockchain infrastructure. Besides,
trustworthiness among the computational resource-enriched
devices has to be established in the blockchain infrastructure.
Besides, the Application Programming Interface (APIs) should
be user-friendly as much as possible.
G. Vehicular Cloud Advertisement Dissemination
As presented in this survey, based on a decentralized
blockchain structure, various anonymity schemes are proposed
to hide the real identities in IoV. Therefore, since the ve-
hicle’s real identity, vehicle’s real location, and transaction
could possibly be disclosed in vehicular cloud advertisement
dissemination [90], critical security issues arise as follows:
• How to design a single-attribute access control protocol
based on blockchain technology for preserving transac-
tion privacy in vehicular cloud advertisement dissemina-
tion?
• How to devise a privacy-preserving secret sharing scheme
based on blockchain technology to acknowledge partici-
pation of selected vehicles in transactions? e.g., by using
the homomorphic Paillier encryption system.
• How to design a low complexity-based authentication
using the blockchain technology between RSUs and par-
ticipating vehicles during the advertisement dissemination
process?
H. Skyline Query Processing
Skyline query has become an important issue in database
research, e.g., centralized database, distributed database, and
similarity search. The surveyed schemes have not yet studied
the possibility of using the skyline query with blockchain.
Recently, Hua et al. [91] proposed a privacy-preserving on-
line medical primary diagnosis framework, named CINEMA,
which uses the skyline query. Specifically, CINEMA frame-
work can protect users’ medical data privacy and ensure the
confidentiality of diagnosis model based on a skyline diagnosis
model. Therefore, how to handle the security and privacy
issues when a skyline diagnosis model is constructed by a lot
of blockchains? Hence, the privacy-preserving schemes based
on the blockchain with skyline query are major challenges and
should be investigated in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of existing
blockchain protocols designed for Internet of Things (IoT)
networks. We provided an overview of the application domains
of blockchain technologies in IoT, e.g., Internet of Vehicles,
Internet of Energy, Internet of Cloud, and Fog computing.
Through extensive research and analysis that was conducted,
we were able to classify the threat models that are considered
by the blockchain protocols in IoT networks, into five main
categories, namely, identity-based attacks, manipulation-based
attacks, cryptanalytic attacks, reputation-based attacks, and
service-based attacks. There still exist several challenging
research areas, such as resiliency against combined attacks,
dynamic and adaptable security framework, compliance with
GDPR, energy-efficient mining, social networks and trust man-
agement, blockchain-specific infrastructure, vehicular cloud
advertisement dissemination, and Skyline query processing,
which should be further investigated in the near future.
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